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Abstract—This paper studies multi-agent distributed estima-
tion under sensor attacks. Individual agents make sensor mea-
surements of an unknown parameter belonging to a compact
set, and, at every time step, a fraction of the agents’ sensor
measurements may fall under attack and take arbitrary values.
We present the Saturated Innovation Update (SIU ) algorithm
for distributed estimation resilient to sensor attacks. Under the
iterative SIU algorithm, if less than one half of the agent sensors
fall under attack, then, all of the agents’ estimates converge at
a polynomial rate (with respect to the number of iterations) to
the true parameter. The resilience of SIU to sensor attacks does
not depend on the topology of the inter-agent communication
network, as long as it remains connected. We demonstrate the
performance of SIU with numerical examples.
Index Terms—Distributed Estimation, Security, Fault Tolerant
Systems, Sensor Networks, Consensus + Innovations
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies resilient distributed parameter estimation
under sensor attacks. A network of agents makes measure-
ments of an unknown parameter θ∗, while an attacker corrupts
a subset of the measurements. The agents’ goal is to recover
the parameter in a fully distributed setting by using local
sensor measurements and exchanging information with neigh-
bors over a communication network. Our work addresses the
following questions: 1) In a fully distributed setting, how can
agents exchange and combine local information to resiliently
estimate θ∗ even when a fraction of the agents’ sensors are
under attack? 2) What is the maximum tolerable fraction of
attacked sensors under which a distributed algorithm resiliently
estimates θ∗? To this end, we develop the Saturated Innova-
tion Update (SIU) algorithm, a consensus+innovations type
algorithm [1]–[4] for resilient distributed parameter estimation,
and we provide sufficient conditions, on the fraction of agents
that may be attacked, under which the SIU algorithm ensures
that every agent correctly estimates θ∗.
A. Related Work
The Byzantine Generals problem [5] demonstrates the effect
of adversarial agents in multi-agent consensus, a special case
of distributed inference, in an all-to-all communication setting.
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Existing work has studied Byzantine attacks (i.e., misbehaving
agents) in the context of numerous decentralized (in which
agents communicate measurements to a fusion center) prob-
lems, e.g., references [6]–[8] study hypothesis testing, and
reference [9] studies parameter estimation. The resilience of
the algorithms proposed in [6]–[9] depends on the fraction of
Byzantine agents.
For fully distributed setups, in which there is no fusion
center, the authors of [10]–[13] propose local filtering al-
gorithms, in which each agent ignores, at every time step,
a subset of its received messages, for consensus [10], [11],
scalar parameter estimation [12], and optimization [13] with
Byzantine agents. The resilience of the algorithms proposed
in [10]–[13] depends on the total number of adversarial agents
and the topology of the inter-agent communication network.
Currently, however, there is no computationally efficient way
to evaluate and design resilient topologies [10].
The authors of [14] design an algorithm for resilient con-
sensus in which each agent needs to know the entire network
topology. Similarly, reference [15] proposes a method for
resilient distributed calculation of a function in which each
agent uses its knowledge of the entire network topology to de-
tect and identify adversaries. The resilience of the algorithms
proposed in [14] and [15] depends on the total number of
Byzantine agents as well as the connectivity of the inter-agent
communication network. Reference [16] provides methods for
sensor placement in response to sensor failures, i.e., when
sensors do not produce any measurements, in distributed
Kalman filtering.1 Our previous work [17] proposed a dis-
tributed algorithm for parameter estimation and detection of
Byzantine agents that depends only on local knowledge and
local communication. The resilience of the algorithm proposed
in [17] depends on the connectivity and global observability
of the normally behaving agents.
B. Summary of Contributions
This paper presents the Saturated Innovation Update (SIU)
algorithm, an iterative, consensus+innovations algorithm for
resilient distributed parameter estimation. We consider a multi-
agent setup, where each agent makes streams of measurements
(over time) of a parameter θ∗, and, at each time step an
attacker manipulates a subset of the measurements. Each agent
maintains a local estimate of θ∗ and updates its estimate
using a weighted combination of its neighbors’ estimates
(consensus) and its sensor measurement (innovation).
During each time step (iteration), each agent applies a time-
varying scalar gain to its own innovation term to ensure that
the `2 norm of the scaled innovation term is below a given
1In contrast, this paper addresses estimation with sensor attacks, i.e., when
sensors produce arbitrary measurements as determined by an adversary.
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2threshold. The SIU algorithm only requires agents to have
local knowledge of the network topology (i.e., agents only
need to know their neighbors and not the entire network
topology), and, achieves the same level of resilience as the
most resilient centralized estimator. As long as less than half
of the agents’ sensors are under attack at any time step, then,
all agents recover θ∗ correctly.
The SIU algorithm offers two main advantages over ex-
isting techniques for resilient distributed computation under
Byzantine attacks [10]–[15]. First, unlike the algorithms pre-
sented in [14] and [15], the SIU algorithm only depends on
agents having local knowledge and do not require agents to
know the entire network. Second, under the SIU algorithms,
the number of tolerable attacks at each time step scales linearly
with the total number of agents regardless of the network
topology, so long as the network is connected. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no other algorithm, aside from SIU ,
for distributed parameter estimation under sensor attack whose
resilience does not depend on network topology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
technical background and specify our sensing, communication,
and attack models in Section II. In Section III, we present
the SIU algorithm. We state and prove our main results
in Sections IV and V, respectively. Under SIU , the agents’
local estimates converge at a polynomial rate to θ∗ when less
than 12 of the agents’ sensors are under attack. We provide
numerical examples of the SIU algorithm in Section VI, and
we conclude in Section VII.
Notation: Let Rk be the k dimensional Euclidean space, Ik
the k by k identity matrix, and 1k and 0k the column vectors of
ones and zeros in Rk, respectively. The operator ‖·‖2 is the `2
norm when applied to vectors and the induced `2 norm when
applied to matrices. For v1, v2 ∈ Rk, let 〈v1, v2〉 = vT1 v2 be
the inner product between v1 and v2. The Kronecker product
of matrices A and B is A ⊗ B . For a symmetric matrix
M =MT , M 0 (M  0) means that M is positive semi-
definite (positive definite).
Let G = (V,E) be a simple, undirected graph, where V =
{1, . . . , N} is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. The
neighborhood Ωn of a vertex n is the set of vertices that share
an edge with n. Let dn = |Ωn| be the degree of a vertex,
and the degree matrix of G is D = diag (d1, . . . , dN ). The
adjacency matrix of G, A = [Anl], where Anl = 1 if (n, l) ∈
E and Anl = 0, otherwise, describes the structure of G. Let
L = D − A be the graph Laplacian of G. The eigenvalues
of L can be ordered as 0 = λ1(L) ≤ . . . ≤ λN (L), and
1N is the eigenvector associated with λ1(L). For a connected
graph G, λ2(L) > 0. References [18], [19] provide a detailed
description of spectral graph theory.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sensing and Communication Model
Consider a network of N agents {1, 2, . . . , N} connected
through a time-invariant inter-agent communication network
G = (V,E) (i.e., the topology of G does not change over
time). The vertex set V = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of agents,
and the edge set E represents the inter-agent communication
links. The agents’ goal is to collectively estimate an unknown
(non-random), static parameter θ∗ ∈ RM (i.e., θ∗ does not
change over time). In the absence of an attacker, each agent
n makes a measurement yn(t) of the parameter θ∗
yn(t) = θ
∗, (1)
where t is the (discrete) time index. Let xn(t) be the estimate
of θ∗ by agent n at time t. The agents’ goal is to ensure that
xn(t)→ θ∗ (2)
for all agents n = 1, . . . , N . Sensing model (1) implies that,
in the absence of an attacker, each agent is locally observable.
That is, in the absence of an attacker, each agent, n, can
exactly determine θ∗ from yn(t). In the presence of an attacker,
however, estimating θ∗ becomes a nontrivial task.
We make the following assumptions regarding the sensing
and network model.
Assumption 1. The graph G is connected.
Assumption 1 can be made without loss of generality, since,
if G were not connected, we can separately consider each
connected component of G. The focus of this paper is resilient
distributed estimation with respect to sensor data attacks, so,
for simplicity and clarity, we assume that the inter-agent
communication is noiseless.
Assumption 2. The `2 norm of θ∗ is bounded by a finite value
η. That is, the parameter θ∗ belongs to a set Θ, defined as
Θ =
{
θ ∈ RM : ‖θ‖2 ≤ η
}
. (3)
Each agent a priori knows the value of η.
Boundedness is a natural assumption, since in many practical
settings for distributed estimation, we estimate parameters
from physical processes (e.g., power grid state estimation [20]
and wireless sensor networks for environmental monitor-
ing [2]2). The values of such parameters are bounded by laws
of physics.
B. Attacker Model
An attacker aims to disrupt the estimation procedure and
prevent the agents from achieving their goal (2). The attacker
may arbitrarily manipulate the sensor measurements of some
of the agents. We model the measurement of a sensor under
attack as
yn(t) = θ
∗ + an(t), (4)
where an(t) is the disturbance induced by the attacker. In
practice, an attacker does not directly design the additive
disturbance an(t). Instead, the attacker replaces the agents’
measurement with any arbitrary yn(t), which can be mod-
eled, following equation (4), by a corresponding an(t). The
attacker may know the true value of the parameter θ∗ and
uses this information to determine how to manipulate sensor
2Existing work on distributed estimation (e.g. [2], [20]) does not account
for the effect of sensor attacks. In contrast, this paper provides a distributed
estimation algorithm that is resilient to sensor attacks.
3measurements and inflict maximum damage.3 In our attacker
model (4), the adversary directly manipulates the sensor
measurements of a subset of the agents. Since the adversary
directly manipulates the measurements, model (4) is a type
of spoofing attack [9], [21], [22]. This model is related to
man-in-the-middle attacks, where the adversary manipulates
communications between the agents and sensors or manipu-
lates data after processing (e.g., quanitization) [21], [22]. Let
the set At denote the set of agents whose sensors are under
attack at time t, i.e.,
At = {n ∈ V |an(t) 6= 0} . (5)
Let Nt = V \ At denote the agents whose sensors are not
under attack at time t. In the presence of an attacker, agents
can no longer achieve (2) by setting xn(t) = yn(t).
We make the following assumptions on the attacker:
Assumption 3. For some 0 ≤ S < N , |At| ≤ S, for all t.
Assumption 4. The attack does not change the value of θ∗.
The agents do not know the set At. Assumption 3 is similar
to the sparse sensor attack assumption found in the cyber-
physical security literature [23]–[25]. We will compare the re-
silience of the SIU algorithm to the resilience of any central-
ized estimation algorithm. Applying Theorem 3.2 from [25], a
necessary and sufficient condition for any centralized estimator
to resiliently recover θ∗ is that the number of attacked sensors
is less than half of all sensors, i.e., |At|N <
1
2 . Assumption 4
states that the attacker does not change the value of the
parameter of interest. The attacker may only manipulate the
measurements yn(t) of a subset of the agents.
The attacker model (4) differs from the Byzantine At-
tacker Model [5]. A Byzantine attacker is able to hijack
a subset of the agents and control all aspects of their be-
havior (i.e., a Byzantine attacker can arbitrarily manipulate
the message generation and estimate generation processes of
hijacked agents). Equation (4) models a simpler attack than
the Byzantine model, but it is still a realistic model. Due
to resource limitations (e.g., time, computation power, etc.,
we refer the reader to [26] for a detailed description relating
attacker resources to attacker capabilities), the attacker directly
manipulates sensor measurements but does not completely
hijack individual agents.
III. SATURATED INNOVATION UPDATE (SIU ) ALGORITHM
The Saturated Innovation Update (SIU) algorithm is a con-
sensus+innovations [1]–[4] algorithm for resilient distributed
estimation. In SIU , every agent maintains and updates a local
estimate xn(t). In contrast with [1]–[4], which assumes that
there is no attacker, the SIU algorithm addresses distributed
estimation when a subset of the agents’ sensors are under
attack. Each iteration of SIU consists of two steps: message
passing and estimate update. To initialize, each agent n sets
its local estimate xn(0) = 0.
3In general, an attacker does not need to know the value of θ∗ to manipulate
measurements. An attacker who does not know the value of θ∗ may not
be able to inflict as much damage as one who does but, without proper
countermeasures, can still prevent the agents from recovering θ∗.
Message Passing: In each iteration, every agent n transmits
its current estimate xn(t) to each of its neighbors. Each agent
n transmits dn messages in each iteration.
Estimate Update: Each agent n ∈ V updates its estimate as
xn(t+ 1) =xn(t)− βt
∑
l∈Ωn
(xn(t)− xl(t))
+ αtKn(t) (yn − xn(t)) ,
(6)
where αt > 0, βt > 0 are sequences of parameters to be
specified in the sequel. The term Kn(t) is a time-varying gain
on the local innovation and is defined as
Kn(t) =
{
1, ‖yn(t)− xn(t)‖2 ≤ γt
γt
‖yn(t)−xn(t)‖2 , otherwise,
(7)
where γt is a parameter to be specified in the sequel.
The gain Kn(t) ensures that the `2 norm of the term
Kn(t) (yn(t)− xn(t)) is upper bounded by γt for all n ∈ V
and for all t. The challenge in designing the SIU algorithm
is selecting the adaptive threshold, γt, which represents how
much sensor measurements are allowed to deviate from the
local estimates. If γt is too small, then, the gain Kn(t) will
limit the impact of uncompromised sensors (n ∈ Nt), and
the agents will not recover θ∗. On the other hand, if γt is too
large, then, the attacker will be able to mislead the agents with
measurements the deviate more from the local estimates. The
key is to choose γt to balance these two effects.
We adopt the following parameter selection procedure:
1) Select resilience index 0 < s < 12 .
2) Select the sequence αt and βt to be of the form
αt =
a
(t+ 1)τ1
, βt =
b
(t+ 1)τ2
, (8)
where 0 < a ≤ 11−2s , 0 < b ≤ 1λN (L) , 0 < τ2 < τ1 < 1.
3) The corresponding γt sequence is
γt = γ1,t + γ2,t, (9)
where γ1,t and γ2,t follow
γ1,t+1 = (1− βtλ2 (L) + κ1αt) γ1,t + κ2αtγ2,t,
γ2,t+1 = αtγ1,t + (1− αt (1− 2s)) γ2,t,
(10)
for κ1 = 1 +
√
N and κ2 = 2
√
N with initial conditions
γ1,0 = 0 and γ2,0 = η. Recall, from (3), that η is the
upper bound on ‖θ∗‖2.
The resilience index s determines the maximum tolerable
fraction of attacked sensors, and, for the SIU algorithm, we
require s < 12 . The resilience index is a design parameter inSIU ; choosing a larger s improves the resilience of SIU but
slows the convergence of estimates to the true parameter.
The gains Kn(t) are state-dependent (i.e., they depend on
the estimates xn(t)) and non-smooth (as functions of the state),
which makes the analysis of SIU nontrivial and quite different
from traditional consensus+innovations procedures [1]–[4] that
rely on the smoothness of the gains to obtain appropriate Lya-
punov conditions for convergence analysis. The analysis with
non-smooth gains as in (7) require new technical machinery
that we develop in this paper.
4IV. MAIN RESULT
We now present our main result, which addresses the
resilience and performance of the SIU algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Resilience of Algorithm SIU). Let αt, βt, and
γt be given by (8), (9), and (10), and let s ∈
(
0, 12
)
be the
resilience index. Under the SIU algorithm, if |At|N < s for all
times t, then, we have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 = 0, (11)
for every agent n and for all 0 ≤ τ0 < τ1 − τ2.
Theorem 1 states that, under SIU , all of the agents’ estimates
converge to θ∗ at a rate of 1tτ0 , for any 0 ≤ τ0 < τ1 − τ2,
so long as less than half of the agents’ sensors fall under
attack, irrespective of how the attacker manipulates the sensor
measurements. Recall that any centralized estimator, which
collects sensor measurements from all of the nodes at once,
is only resilient to attacks on less than half of the sensors.
The SIU algorithm ensures that all of the agents’ recover the
value θ∗ even though it does not explicity identify those agents
who are under attack. The SIU algorithm achieves, in a fully
distributed setting, the same resilience as the most resilient
centralized estimator, regardless of the topology of the inter-
agent communication network (so long as it is connected).
Under the SIU algorithm, the message generation and esti-
mate update for each agent only depends on the agent’s local
knowledge. Existing algorithms for resilient distributed con-
sensus [14] and resilient distributed function calculation [15]
require each agent to have knowledge of the entire structure
of the communication network. When there are many agents
in the network, algorithms requiring global network knowl-
edge become expensive from both memory and computation
perspectives.
In addition, existing work on distributed algorithms resilient
to Byzantine attackers shows that, in general, the resilience of
an algorithm (i.e., the number of tolerable Byzantine agents)
depends on the structure of the network [10]–[15]. Under our
attack model (4), the number of tolerable attacks for SIU al-
gorithms scales linearly with the number of agents, regardless
of the (connected) network topology. When the resilience of
algorithms depends on network structure (e.g. [10]–[15]), the
number of tolerable attacks does not necessarily increase as
the number of agents grows. In comparison, for any connected
structure, SIU ensures resilient estimation if less half of the
agents’ sensors are under attack.
V. ANALYSIS OF SIU : PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to analyze conver-
gence properties of time-varying linear systems of the form:
vt+1 = (1− c3r1(t)) vt + c4r1(t)wt,
wt+1 = (1− c5r2(t) + c6r1(t))wt + c7r1(t)vt,
(12)
with nonzero initial conditions v0, w0 6= 0 where r1(t) and
r2(t) follow
r1(t) =
c1
(t+ 1)δ1
, r2(t) =
c2
(t+ 1)δ2
, (13)
with δ1 > δ2 and c3, . . . , c7 > 0. Specifically, we require the
following lemma, the proof of which may be found in the
appendix.
Lemma 1. The system in (12) satisfies
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0vt = 0, (14)
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0wt = 0, (15)
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2.
We now prove Theorem 1.
Proof (Theorem 1):: We analyze the behavior of the
agents’ average estimate. Define the stacked estimate xt =[
x1(t)
T · · · xN (t)T
]T
, the stacked measurements yt =[
y1(t)
T · · · yN (t)T
]T
, and the network average esti-
mate xt = 1N
(
1TN ⊗ IM
)
xt. Further define
K˜n(t) = Kn(t)1{n∈Nt}, (16)
Kt = diag (K1(t), . . . ,KN (t)) , (17)
KNt =
(
K˜1(t), . . . , K˜N (t)
)
, (18)
KAt = Kt −KNt . (19)
Step 1: We determine the dynamics of xt and xt. From (6),
we have that xt follows the dynamics
xt+1 = (INM − βtL⊗ IM − αtKNt ⊗ IM )xt+
αt (KAt ⊗ IM )yt.
(20)
Define ŷt, the difference between the local estimates and the
average estimate, as ŷt = xt − 1N ⊗ xt, and et, the average
error, as et = xt − θ∗. Further define the matrix PNM as
PNM =
1
N
(1N ⊗ IM ) (1N ⊗ IM )T . (21)
Note that PNM (1N ⊗ xt) = 1N ⊗ xt. From (20), we have
that ŷt follows
ŷt+1 = (INM − βtL⊗ IM − PNM ) ŷt+
αt (INM − PNM ) ((KNt +KAt)⊗ IM ) (yt − xt) .
(22)
Following [3], for 0 < βt ≤ 1λN (L) , the eigenvalues of the
matrix INM − βtL⊗ IM − PNM are 0 and 1− βtλn (L) for
n = 2, . . . , N , each repeated M times.
For n ∈ Nt, we have yt − xt = ŷt + 1N ⊗ et. Then,
equation (22) becomes
ŷt+1 = (INM − βtL⊗ IM − PNM ) ŷt−
αt (INM − PNM ) (KNt ⊗ IM ) (ŷt + 1N ⊗ et) +
αt (INM − PNM ) (KAt ⊗ IM ) (yt − xt) .
(23)
The process et evolves as
et+1 =
(
1− αt
N
trace (KNt)
)
et−
αt
N
(
1TN ⊗ IM
)
(KNt ⊗ IM ) ŷt+
αt
N
(
1TN ⊗ IM
)
(KAt ⊗ IM ) (yt − xt) .
(24)
5Step 2: From (23) and (24), we find upper bounds on ‖ŷt‖2
and ‖et‖2. Let Vt = ‖ŷt‖2, and let Wt = ‖et‖2. In order to
compute Vt and Wt, we require the following facts:
‖INM − PNM‖2 = 1, (25)
‖KNt ⊗ IM‖2 ≤ 1, (26)
‖(KNt ⊗ IM ) (1N ⊗ et)‖2 ≤
√
|Nt| ‖et‖2 . (27)
Equation (25) follows directly from the definition of PNM .
Inequality (26) follows from the fact that 0 < Kn(t) ≤ 1.
Inequality (27) follows from
‖(KNt ⊗ IM ) (1N ⊗ et)‖2 =
√∑
n∈Nt
(Kn(t))
2 ‖et‖2,
≤
√
|Nt| ‖et‖2 . (28)
Computing the `2 norm of both sides of (23) and (24), and
using the fact that, ‖Kn(t) (yn(t)− xn(t))‖2 ≤ γt = γ1,t +
γ2,t for any n ∈ At, we have
Vt+1 ≤ (1− βtλ2 (L) + αt)Vt + αtWt
√
|Nt|+
αtγt
√
|At|,
(29)
Wt+1 ≤
(
1− αt
N
trace (KNt)
)
Wt +
αtγt |At|
N
+
αt
N
∥∥(1TN ⊗ IM) (KNt ⊗ IM ) ŷt∥∥2 . (30)
Step 3: We now use induction to show that, if |At|N < s for
all t ≥ 0, then, Vt ≤ γ1,t and Wt ≤ γ2,t for all t ≥ 0. In the
base case, we consider t = 0, and we have xn(0) = 0 for all
n. Thus, we have x0 = 0. For all n ∈ V , ‖xn(0)− x0‖2 = 0,
which means that ‖ŷt‖2 = 0 = γ1,0. Moreover, since x0 = 0,
we have ‖et‖2 = ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ η = γ2,0.
Step 4: In the induction step, we assume that Vt ≤
γ1,t and Wt ≤ γ2,t, and we show that Vt+1 ≤ γ1,t+1
and Wt+1 ≤ γ2,t+1. Substituting the induction hypotheses
into (29) and (30), we have
Vt+1 ≤ (1− βtλ2 (L) + κ1αt) γ1,t + 2αtγ2,t
√
N, (31)
Wt+1 ≤
(
1− αt
(
trace
(
KNt
N
)
− |At|
N
))
γ2,t+
αt
( |Nt|+ |At|
N
)
γ1,t,
(32)
where, recall, κ1 = 1+
√
N . To derive (31), we have used the
fact that 2
√
N ≥√|At|+√|Nt|. To derive (32), we have used
the fact that
∥∥(1TN ⊗ IM) (KNt ⊗ IM ) ŷt∥∥2 ≤ |Nt| ‖ŷt‖2 .
Inequality (32) states that Wt+1 depends on the term
trace
(
KNt
N
)
=
1
N
∑
n∈Nt
Kn(t),
which, by definition of Kn(t), depends on ‖yn(t)− xn(t)‖2.
Note that, by definition of Nt, we have yn(t) = θ∗ for all
n ∈ Nt. Applying the triangle inequality and the induction
hypotheses, we have
‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖xn(t)− xt‖2 + ‖xt − θ∗‖2 , (33)
≤ γ1,t + γ2,t = γt. (34)
Inequality (34) implies that Kn(t) = 1 for all n ∈ Nt,
which means that trace
(
KNt
N
)
= 1 − |At|N . Substituting
trace
(
KNt
N
)
= 1 − |At|N into (32) and using the fact that
|At|
N < s, we have
Wt+1 ≤ (1− αt (1− 2s)) γ2,t + αtγ1,t, (35)
which yields the relation Wt+1 ≤ γ2,t. The relation Vt+1 ≤
γ1,t follows directly from (31).
Step 5: We now study the behavior of γ1,t and γ2,t. So long
as 0 < s < 12 , system (10), which describes the dynamics of
γ1,t and γ2,t, falls under the purview of Lemma 1.4 Thus we
have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0γi,t = 0, (36)
i = 1, 2, for all 0 ≤ τ0 < τ1 − τ2. Combining (36) with (34)
yields the desired result: for every agent n and for all 0 ≤
τ0 < τ1 − τ2,
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 = 0. (37)
As a consequence of Theorem 1, if ‖At‖N < s <
1
2 for all t,
then, for all n ∈ V and for all 0 ≤ τ0 < τ1 − τ2, there exists
finite Rn > 0 such that ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 < Rn(t+1)τ0 . The rate τ0
depends only on the choice of τ1 and τ2, but the constant Rn
depends on the behavior of γ1,t and γ2,t. The behavior of γ2,t
depends on the resilience index s – the term (1− αt(1− 2s))
increases as s increases, which means that the constant Rn
increases as well. Thus, in the SIU algorithm, there is a trade
off between resilience and convergence of estimates to the true
parameter.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In our numerical simulations, we consider the random
geometric network of N = 300 agents given by Figure 1. Each
agent observes a parameter θ∗ ∈ R3 with bounded energy
‖θ∗‖2 ≤ η = 100. The agents represent, for example, a team
of robots tracking a target. The parameter θ∗ is the target’s
location, expressed in its x, y, and z coordinates. We consider
attacks on S1 = 60 and S2 = 120 agents, respectively, and
we choose corresponding resilience indices of s1 = 0.201
and s2 = 0.401. In each simulation, we run SIU for
t = 500, 000 iterations. We choose the following parameters:
a = 1.54× 10−4, b = 3.78× 10−2, τ1 = 0.15, τ2 = 0.001.
We examine the algorithm’s performance with both fixed
and time-varying attack sets, which are chosen uniformly at
random. The adversary changes the measurement of each agent
under attack (n ∈ At) to yn(t) = −θ∗. The resilience of SIU
does not depend on the adversary’s strategy. Figure 2 shows
that, for both fixed and time varying attack sets, and for both
attacks on S1 = 60 and S2 = 120 agents, the SIU algorithm
ensures that all of the agents’ local estimates converge to θ∗.
The estimates converge more quickly when the resilience index
is lower and there are fewer agents under attack (i.e., S1 = 60).
4If s ≥ 1
2
, then the right hand side of (35) does not converge to 0.
Thus, (35) establishes the maximum fraction of tolerable attacks for SIU .
6Fig. 1: Random geometric network of N = 300 agents.
Fig. 2: Performance of MSIU algorithm with (Top) resilience index
s1 = 0.201 subject to attacks on S1 = 60 agent sensors and (Bottom)
resilience index s2 = 0.401 subject to attacks on S2 = 120 sensors.
In general, there is a trade off between resilience and the rate at
which the local estimates converge to the parameter of interest.
Recall, from the proof of Theorem 1, that the threshold
γt is an upper bound on the `2 norm of the local estimation
error, ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2. We demonstrate the trade off between
the algorithm’s resilience index and the error bound γt. Fig-
Fig. 3: Trade off between resilience index s and the error bound γt
after t = 500, 000 iterations of SIU .
ure 3 shows that, as we increase the resilience index s, the
error bound γt (after t = 500, 000 iterations) also increases.
According to Theorem 1, the SIU algorithm ensures that the
local estimates converge to θ∗ eventually as long as less than
sN agents are under attack. In practice however, we may not
be able to run an arbitrarily large number of iterations of SIU ,
so we are interested in the error performance after a finite
number of iterations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the Saturated Innovation
Update (SIU) algorithm, a consensus + innovations iterative
distributed algorithm for resilient parameter estimation under
sensor attacks. Under SIU for any (connected) network topol-
ogy, local estimates of all agents converge polynomially to the
parameter of interest if less than half of the agents’ sensors are
under attack. The number of tolerable attacks scales linearly
with the number of agents, irrespective of the (connected)
network topology. The SIU algorithm achieves the same level
of resilience in a fully distributed setting as the most resilient
centralized estimator. We demonstrated the performance of the
SIU algorithms with numerical examples, and we showed that
there exists a trade off between resilience and error perfor-
mance. Future work will study resilient distributed estimation
with more complicated sensing and communication models,
e.g., communication networks with failing links, measurement
noise, and time-varying dynamic parameters.
APPENDIX
A. Intermediate Results
The proof of Lemma 1 requires several intermediate results.
The following results, from [1] and [3], study the convergence
of scalar time-varying linear systems of the form
vt+1 = (1− r2(t)) vt + r1(t), (38)
with r1(t), r2(t) of the form
r1(t) =
c1
(t+ 1)δ1
, r2(t) =
c2
(t+ 1)δ2
, (39)
where c1, c2 > 0 and 0 < δ2 ≤ δ1 < 1.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 25 in [3]). Let r1(t) and r2(t) follow (39).
If δ1 = δ2, then there exists B > 0, such that, for sufficiently
large non-negative integers, j < t, we have
0 ≤
t−1∑
k=j
[(
t−1∏
l=k+1
(1− r2(l))
)
r1(k)
]
≤ B, (40)
where the constant B can be chosen independently of t, j. If
δ2 < δ1, then, for arbitrary fixed j, we have
lim
t→∞
t−1∑
k=j
[(
t−1∏
l=k+1
(1− r2(l))
)
r1(k)
]
= 0. (41)
As a consequence of Lemma 2, for the system given by (38),
if δ1 = δ2, then, |vt| remains bounded. If δ1 > δ2, then vt
converges to 0.
The following result characterizes the rate of convergence
of vt (given by (38)) when δ1 > δ2.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 5 in [1]). Consider the system in (38) with
δ2 < δ1. Then, we have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0vt = 0, (42)
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2 and for all initial conditions v0.
7We present the following modification of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Consider the scalar time-varying linear system:
vt+1 = (1− c3r2(t) + c4r1(t)) vt + c5r1(t), (43)
where r1(t), r2(t) satisfy (39), δ1 > δ2, and c3, c4, c5 > 0.
The system in (43) satisfies
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0vt = 0, (44)
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2 and for all initial conditions v0.
Proof: Consider the expression c3r2(t) − c4r1(t). Since
δ1 > δ2, for any 0 <  < δ1 − δ2, there exists T 0 , such that,
for all t ≥ T 0 , we have c3r2(t) − c4r1(t) ≥ (t + 1)−(δ2+).
Moreover, since r2(t) decreases in t and c4r1(t) ≥ 0, there
exists T1 such that, for all t ≥ T1, we have c3r2(t)−c4r1(t) ≤
1. Let T = max (T 0 , T1). Thus, for all t ≥ T , we have
(t+ 1)−(δ2+) ≤ c3r2(t)− c4r1(t) ≤ 1, (45)
which means that, for all t ≥ T , we have
|vt+1| ≤ (1− c3r2(t) + c4r1(t)) |vt|+ c5r1(t). (46)
Let wT = |vT |, and, for t ≥ T , define the time-varying linear
system
wt+1 =
(
1− (t+ 1)−(δ2+)
)
wt + c5r1(t). (47)
As a consequence of (45), we have |vt| ≤ wt for all t ≥ T .
The system in (47) falls under the purview of Lemma 3, which
yields (44).
We now consider the system defined in (12):
vt+1 = (1− c3r1(t)) vt + c4r1(t)wt,
wt+1 = (1− c5r2(t) + c6r1(t))wt + c7r1(t)vt,
The following lemma shows that vt and wt remain bounded.
Lemma 5. The system in (12) satisfies
sup
t≥0
|vt| <∞, (48)
sup
t≥0
|wt| <∞. (49)
Proof: Step 1: We first show that supt≥0 |wt| <∞. Since
r1(t) and r2(t) decrease in t, and, since δ1 > δ2, there exists
(finite) T0 ≥ 0 such that, for all t > T0,
0 ≤ 1− c3r1(t) ≤ 1, (50)
0 ≤ 1− c5r2(t) + c6r1(t) ≤ 1. (51)
For all t ≥ T0, we can express vt as
vt =
t−1∏
j=T0
(1− c3r1(j)) vT0+
t−1∑
j=T0
 t−1∏
k=j+1
(1− c3r1(k))
 c4r1(j)wj ,
(52)
which means that, as a consequence of (40),
|vt| ≤ |vT0 |+ c8 sup
l∈[T0,t]
|wl| , (53)
for some constant c8 > 0.
Step 2: From (12), we have
|wt+1| ≤ (1− c5r2(t) + c6r1(t)) |wt|+ c7r1(t) |vt| , (54)
≤ (1− c5r2(t) + c9r1(t)) sup
l∈[T0,t]
|wl|+ c10r1(t), (55)
where c9 = c6 + c7 and c10 = c7 |vT0 |. Define the system
mt+1 =
max (mt, (1− c5r2(t) + c9r1(t))mt + c10r1(t)) ,
(56)
for t ≥ T0 with initial condition mT0 = |wT0 |. By definition,
we have mt ≥ supl∈[T0,t] |wl|. Define the system
m˜t+1 = (1− c5r2(t) + c9r1(t)) m˜t + c10r1(t), (57)
for t ≥ T0 with initial condition m˜T0 = mT0 = |wT0 |. Note
that m˜T0 ≥ 0 and that, since t > T0, 1−c5r2(t)+c9r1(t) ≥ 0,
m˜t nonnegative for all t ≥ T0. Further, note that system (57)
falls under the purview of Lemma 4, so we have
lim
t→∞ m˜t = 0. (58)
Step 3: Since m˜t is a nonnegative sequence that converges
to 0, there exists a time T1 ≥ T0 such that m˜T1+1 ≤ m˜T1 .
Consider the smallest such choice of T1 ≥ T0. By definition of
T1, we have m˜T0 < m˜T0+1 < · · · < m˜T1 . Then, from (56), we
have mt = m˜t for all t ∈ [T0, T1]. Thus, we have mt ≤ mT1
for all t ∈ [T0, T1]. Further, by definition of T1 and mt, we
have mT1+1 = mT1 . We now show that mt = mT1 for all
t ≥ T1.
Define, for t ≥ T1,
J1(t) = mT1 − (1− c5r2(t) + c9r1(t))mT1 − c10r1(t). (59)
We define J1(t) to be the difference between mT1 and
(1− c5r2(t) + c9r1(t))mT1 + c10r1(t). If J1(t) ≥ 0 for all
t ≥ T1, then, by (56), we have mt = mT1 for all t ≥ T1. By
definition mT1 > 0, so, after algebraic manipulation, we have
J1(t) =
(
c11
(t+ 1)δ2
− c12
(t+ 1)δ1
)
mT1 , (60)
where c11 = c5c2 > 0 and c12 =
(
c6 +
c10
mT1
)
c1 > 0. Since
mT1+1 = mT1 , J(T1) must be nonnegative, which is true if
and only if
T1 ≥
(
c12
c11
) 1
δ1−δ2 − 1, (61)
so all t ≥ T1 are also at least the right hand side of (61),
which means that J1(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ T1.
Step 4: Thus we have mt = mT1 for all t ≥ T1. Using
the fact that mt ≤ mT1 for all t ∈ [T0, T1], and mt ≥
supl∈[T0,t] |wl|, we have
sup
t≥T0
|wt| ≤ mT1 <∞. (62)
Since T0 <∞, we also have
sup
t∈[0,T0]
|wt| <∞. (63)
8Combining (62) and (63) yields (49). Now, we show that
supt≥0 |vt| < ∞. Let supt≥0 |wt| = Bw < ∞. By (53), we
have
sup
t≥T0
|vt| ≤ |vT0 |+ c8Bw <∞. (64)
Since T0 <∞, we also have
sup
t∈[0,T0]
|vt| <∞. (65)
Combining (64) and (65) yields (48).
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We first prove (15), that limt→∞(t+ 1)δ0wt = 0
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2. From Lemma 5, we have |vt| ≤
Bv <∞. Then, for sufficiently large t, we have
|wt+1| ≤ (1− c5r2(t) + c6r1(t)) |wt|+ c7Bvr1(t). (66)
The recursion in (66) falls under the purview of Lemma 4,
and (15) immediately follows. Further, as a consequence of
Lemma 4, there exists Rw > 0 such that |wt| < Rw(t+ 1)δ0 ,
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2. We now prove (14). Since |wt| <
Rw(t+ 1)
δ0 , we have, for sufficiently large t,
|vt+1| ≤ (1− c3r1(t)) |vt|+ c1c4Rw
(t+ 1)δ1+δ0
. (67)
The recursion in (67) falls under the purview of Lemma 3,
and we have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ′0vt = 0, (68)
for all 0 ≤ δ′0 < δ0. Taking δ0 arbitrarily close to δ1 − δ2
yields (14).
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